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When Coercion Takes Over: The Limits of Social Capital in 
Microfinance Schemes1 
Peer Smets and Erik Bahre 
Social capital in microfinance: why it matters 
The United Nations has proclaimed the year 2005 the International Year of 
Microfinance. Microfinance has been accorded this special attention because 
it is believed to help people out of poverty. In addition to its clear financial 
goals, the UN declaration states that microfinance increases the empower-
ment of women and contributes to the social and human development 
process in general (UN 1998). Microfinance is expected to be more than a 
financial service used in the fight against poverty. It is also expected to 
contribute to empowerment and a social environment that is essential to 
people's well-being. 
The concept of social capital has come to play a pivotal role in the 
debates, as well as policies, concerning microfinance schemes. There is a 
growing amount of literature that highlights that social capital is crucial to 
the functioning of microfinance schemes and that social capital should be 
strengthened and supported (e.g. Mayoux 2001a; 20016; Molyneux 2002; 
Quinones and Seibel 2000; Bernasek and Stanfield 1997). Why has social 
capital become so pivotal to the microfinance debate and should we foster 
the attention paid to social capital or should the emphasis on social capital 
raise our concern? 
The attention paid to social capital in the development literature has 
been accompanied by a change in economics, in which the correction of 
imperfections in economic and non-economic relations at a micro level 
dominates the main topic of discussion. It is thought that imperfect 
information may lead to inefficient projects and schemes, reflected in 
mismatches between demand and supply. Under such circumstances, 
individuals have to make decisions about whether to establish or partake in 
social structured activities in market and non-market organizations or in 
another organization falling between both types. Here, micro-economics are 
often used to explain phenomena at the macro level, a practice which has led 
to different types of new micro-economics: new growth theory; new trade 
economy; new institutional economics; new household economics; new 
political economy; etc. In these new endeavors the focus of economics is also 
directed towards areas that were previously the exclusive domain of the 
socio-cultural sciences (Fine 1999:2-4). 
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By using the label 'social capital' ~nstea1 of the, sp~cific te~m~ that are 
popular within sections of the social sciences, social capital opened 
possibilities for interdisciplinary approaches, have . been. ope':ed . up. 
Woolcock (1998:188) describes this as follows: In soC1al capital, h1stonans, 
political scientists, anthropologists, economists, and policy maker~ [: .. ]. may 
once again begin to find a common language [ ... ] that d1sc1plmary 
provincialisms have largely suppr~ssed over. th<; last one-hundred-and_ fifty 
years.' Indubitably, the concept social capital has become so p~omm:nt 
because it offers possibilities for a multidisciplinary approach m which 
economic and social sciences can be combined (see also Fine 1999; Portes 
1998:2-3). 
The exact nature of social capital is somewhat nebulous. Likewise, there 
is a lack of clarity about what role it should play in the field of development. 
Molyneux (2002: 176) even suggests that the conceptual opaqueness of 
social capital could serve certain interests: 'What social capital mea~s to 
development agents, and how they think it should be strengthen~d, differs 
according to the political and institutional arrangements that prevail and the 
cultural context in which policies are applied'. It is quite a challenge to 
define what social capital is but some issues definitely offer a key to the , 
term.-
Basically, social capital makes it possible to make a gain through social 
relations.3 Particularly in the late 1990s, social capital became a popular 
concept in risk assessment in the microfinance industry. _The microfinance 
industry deals mainly with the poor, who lack a su~c1ently regular and 
sufficiently high salaried income or enough possessions to be u~ed as 
collateral. Such conventional collateral has to a large extent, 1f not 
completely, been replaced by non-conventi~nal or social c~l~ateral. The 
strength lies in the social constraint mechanism among pamc1pants; they 
exert pressure on each other or on specific. participants to ~nc~urage 
payments to be made on time. Here, the security of repayment lies m the 
' The interpretations of social capital differ enormously. Van Bastelaer (1999) 
distinguishes three types. The first interpretation restricts social capital to a set of 
horizontal networks between people and related norms that influence the productivity 
of che community (see Putnam 1993). Secondly, a broader concept of social capital is 
associated with Coleman (1990), who includes horizontal as well as vertical associations 
among people, but also other entities such as private enterprises. The thi~d 
interpretation encompasses the political and social environment chat forms the social 
structure and enables the development of norms and values. Apart from horizontal and 
vertical local networks, it also includes institutional structures, such as economic bodies, 
- - - - - __ .J .-:u:1 ..-. n~ nnlirir 'l) nriv i)pap~ 
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h~nds of the customers, possibly in collaboration with agents of the 
m1crofinance scheme. Conventional collateral is mainly institution biased. 
Social collateral is used as an alternative where the principal emphasis is 
placed on financial intermediation between borrowers and lenders through 
groups. Groups include small solidarity groups such as used by ACCION 
~d the_Grameen Bank, but may also encompass large credit unions or caises 
vzl":,geo~s (Ledgerwood 1999:77). Microfinance institutions promote change, 
which serves to weaken some aspects of social capital: old networks get 
destroyed, and a past that contains rapid upheaval may reduce incentives to 
invest in reputation mechanism' (Stiglitz 2000:64), or in the words of 
Ledgerwood {1999: 7 6): '[I] t is easier to establish sustainable financial 
intermediation systems with the poor in societies that encourage cooperative 
efforts through local clubs, temple associations, or work groups - in other 
words, societies with high levels of social capital.' 
So~ial capital is regarded as a tool that enables poor, marginal people to 
org~mze themselves. In this light, it is treated as a source of power, 
particularly for women. Mayoux (2001b:438) argues that this lies at the core 
of microfinance schemes: 'The underlying assumption is that the material 
benefit which clients receive in terms of access to credit and savings is an 
acceptable exchange for material contribution in the form of interest rates 
and social capital'. 
Social capit~ c~n als? ~e seen as a kind_ of social glue. It holds society 
tog~ther, ~orkmg m a similar ~~y to cohesion and solidarity. The concept 
social capital stresses the posmve aspect of dense social networks and 
community control.
4 It is expected that microfinance schemes will benefit 
women in particular as it should strengthen women's social networks and 
institutions and thus contribute to empowerment (see e.g. Hunt and 
Kasynathan 2001; Milgrarn 2001). 
This sum~ary gives a very positive view of social capital: social capital is 
e~pected to give people access to resources through their social networks, 
with the added bonus of a function as a social cohesive. Portes reveals that 
social s~i~ntis~s ten~ to associat: soci~ ca~ital too easily with sociability and 
the posmve d1mens1ons of relations: [I] t 1s our sociological bias to see good 
things emerging out of sociability, bad things are more commonly associated 
with the behavior of the homo economicus' (Portes 1998: 15). To achieve a 
balanced picture, the less desirable aspects of social capital need to be 
examined in order to avoid a debate that is governed by moralizing 
statements about what community networks should be like and how control 
mech~nism should work ideally. Undeniably, social capital can have severe 
negative consequences, such as the exclusion of outsiders, the unwelcome 
consequences of excessive claims on group members, the restriction on 
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individual freedoms, as well as the highlighting of downward leveling norms 
(Fine 1999; Portes 1998:10-13). Research in Bangladesh_ revealed that the 
donor's attempts to strengthen c_ivil _society actually_ remforce patronage 
relationships and inequality, making it even more difficult for peop_le to 
escape poverty (Davis and McGregor 2000; McGreg~r 1989). Only if we 
seriously examine the downside of these dense social network~ can _we 
understand what the effects of strengthening these networks and mcreasmg 
control mechanism are. 
Against the prevailing single-sided positive a~~oun~ of social ~apital'. there 
is a growing literature that contradicts the posmve view of s?cial capital. A 
wide variety of experiences of re~earch:rs ~nd devel_opers m t~e field of 
microfinance has revealed that social capital is not all it has promised to be. 
Mayoux (2001 b:450) uses the term 'negative social capital' to capture the 
destructive side of social capital: 
The assumption underlying the paradigm is that social capital is 
inherently positive and beneficial and can be used by programmes 
without external intervention co build or increase it. This optimism is 
based on a very narrow understanding of the concept of social capital 
focusing on horizontal norms, networks and associations assumed to 
generate crust and information which can be used by micro-finance 
programmes (Mayoux 2001 b:439). 
The existence of the term 'negative social capital' implies that the damaging 
dimensions of social relations need to be examined. Some literature ~n 
microfinance has already exposed these negative consequences of social 
capital. There are t_hree maj_or del:teri?us ~ffects . 
Firstly, emphasis on social capital m microfinance c~n lead to c~ercion of 
and violence towards borrowers. Rahman (1999:70) illustrates this for the 
Grameen Bank, where one of the female participants could n~t pay her 
installments for a couple of weeks. Peers brought her to the bank. The bank 
workers asked the woman to sit inside a room in the Bank and locked the 
door from outside. The woman felt so humiliated ( ... ) that she hanged 
herself from the roof-fan by using her own sari (women's clothing in r1:1ral 
Bangladesh)'. Cogently, the impact of the u~e of a control m:chamsm 
declines during times of long-term econ~mic proble~s a~d mcreased 
violence. Under such circumstances, reciprocal relationships between 
households diminish and consequently social capital deteriorates (Moser 
1998:13-14). . . 
Secondly, instead of increasin~ empower?1e~t and stre':1gthenm~ social 
relations in such a way that they mcrease solidarity and social coh_esion, t~e 
nmvi~inn nf microfinance can also strengthen unequal power relations. This 
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that social cohesion and solidarity can be particularly burdensome for less 
powerful members of households. For women in particular it is often 
difficult to cope with economic adversities: 'While households are an 
important asset providing security and redistributing income, they can also 
be sources of inequality for members on whom unequal burdens are 
imposed' (Moser 1998: 12). Given this, increasing social capital and 
strengthening social relations can strengthen the inequalities that are 
embedded in these relations. Molyneux (2002) also found that increasing 
social capital does not necessarily challenge unequal power relations: 'Since 
power relations within societies are reflected in and reproduced by social 
networks, women can find themselves disadvantaged' (ibid.:181). Moser 
(1998) and Molyneux (2002) warn us against the negative consequences 
that increasing social capital can have on vulnerable groups. Microfinance 
through social capital might aim to generate equality and empowerment but 
is in danger of doing just the opposite. 
Thirdly, the application of social capital in microfinance can undermine 
social cohesion and trust. Molyneux (2002: 182) describes this situation as 
follows: ' ... as far as social capital is concerned, it has been observed that 
many micro-finance projects, far from creating and sustaining social capital 
may instead serve to undermined social solidarity in failing to foster co-
operative relations among members and creating a socially corrosive 
competitive individualism.' This is exactly why Portes ( 1998) emphasizes 
that social collateral does not always have positive impacts on society. 
Therefore it is imperative to examine the negative consequences of 
strengthening social capital. To operacionalize the concept of social capital 
as it will be used later in this chapter, we will focus on the concepts of the 
social network, trust, and control mechanism. We will take informal 
financial self-help organizations in India and South Africa as a starting point 
for gaining an understanding of social capital because this offers the 
possibility of looking at the relations of people behind the institutions in 
different contexts. 
Financial self-help organizations in India and South Africa 
Before microfinance schemes became an important instrument of 
development organizations in the eradication of poverty, the poor, as well as 
the not-so poor, had organized a myriad of financial self-help organizations 
where the members could save money together, lend money to each other, 
or insure one another. In fact, these financial self-help organizations were a 
crucial source of inspiration for the development of microfinance schemes. 
They revealed that across the globe poverty-stricken people managed to save 
mont>v collt>ctivt>lv. t>Vt>n in tht> ::ih~t>nrP nf' rnnvPntinn::il rnll::itPr::il •mrh ::i<: 
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in a legal void, which means that they cannot go to the police or judicial 
institution in the case of a default. 
In the absence of judicial institutions and conventional collateral, social 
relations become the most important organizational power in financial self-
help organizations, leading to many 1iff~rent. kind. of organizatio':1s.
5 
Examining urban financial self-help organizations m India ~d Sour? Afnca, 
provides a comprehensible picture of exactly what thes~ social relat1ons are, 
under which circumstances they enable someone to gam resources through 
them, how they can generate trust or distrust in society, and what the 
dynamics of control me~ha~ism ~nd co~rcion precisely ar~. The st~dy of 
financial self-help organizations m India and_ South ~nca permits the 
building up of an understanding of the dynamics_ o~ s~ci~ capital, thereby 
revealing their potential for self-help, as we!l ~ thei: limit~t1ons. . 
A good look at financial self-help orgamzat1ons m India and South -:'fnca 
shows the way social capital works in practice. Th~ ad:antage o~ lo~king at 
these two particular countries is that such an examm~t1on can h~ghl!ght the 
different contexts in which social capital can be built and mamtamed, as 
well as in which instances social capital proves insufficient for the proper 
functioning of financial self-help organizations. . . . 
The Indian examples of financial self-help organizanons ar~ provided by 
Smets. During his research in Sangli in 1990 and Hyderabad m 1993-1994 
(Smets 1992; 2000), he came across a myriad of financial self-he!p 
organizations. In Sangli, they ':'~re cal_led bishis ~nd bishi mandals and m 
Hyderabad chit funds and chimes. Finance denved from. these self-h~lp 
organizations was used for many different purposes such ~s mco~e-earnmg 
activities, school fees, dowries, festivals, household utensils, furniture, an? 
shelter. Some financial self-help organizations, like one among. th~ semi-
nomadic ethnic group Mandula were even used to finance_ the buildi~g of a 
community hall with mud walls and an asbestos roof. It 1s also possibl: to 
use participation in a financial self-help organization as collater~ to obtam a 
loan. Some participants use the money from the financial s:lf-~elp 
organization for business purposes. Depending on the type of o~gamzanon, 
membership varies from fifteen up to a few hundred. ~he fin3;11cial self-help 
organizations are organized among people fr~m a w~d~ v~ne~ of cast:s, 
religions, and classes. Contrary to popular belief, pamcipat~on m financial 
self-help organizations is not restricted only to the poor. It 1s even popular 
among bank employees (e.g. Smets 1992) and high-class women (Smets 
1998). 
Bahre (1996; 2000; 2001; 2002) did research among Africans in Cape 
Town, South Africa, in 1995 and in 1997-1998. His research focused 
• I lr I 1 
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mainly_ on African migrants who after the abolition of the pass laws in 1986 
:ind wit? the first democratic elections in 1994 could finally leave the 
impovenshed Bantustans. Most migrants were poor and tried to find 
empl~yment as an unskilled worker. One of the first organizations that they 
established was a financial self-help organization. Consequently, financial 
self-help organizations were one of the first building blocks of social capital 
among neighboring migrants. 
T~ese ~nancial self-he~p organizations were locally known as umgalelo, 
umaszphekzsane, and umasmgcwabane. The size varied from three up to a few 
hundred members, depending on the type of organization. Most members 
used the money to pay for school fees, funerals, furniture, food, and 
hou~ehold utensils. H~re, money was rarely used for building purposes. 
~emnendy, many relatives depended on the remittances of labor migrants 
m Cape Town and financial self-help organizations allowed the migrants to 
save money for people at home. 
Social networks 
The kind of network of participants in financial self-help organizations is 
one of the key dimensions to understanding social capital. A distinction can 
be made between horizontal and vertical relations, each type generating its 
own social dynamics. Participants in organizations with horizontal relations 
often share the same value orientations and power status, but these relations 
can also be prone to envy, jealousy, ineffective leadership, pressure of 
different ethnic or religious identities, and the existence of political 
machine-like organizations (De Wit 1993:26). In a vertical social network, 
people with different value orientations and power status are linked. An 
example of a_ ve~tical social network is a patron-client relationship or 
patronage, which is based on expected advantages for both parties involved. 
A patron expects respect, support, services and/or votes in return for the 
goods and services he promises and/or delivers to the client(s). Because the 
patron is the one who can influence the allocation of goods and services, he 
has more advantages in the bargain and transaction, it is the patron who can 
fix the exchange price (Ellemers 1969:433-4). Patrons tend to solve conflicts 
only to such an extent to ensure that some tensions are maintained. In this 
way, these leaders make themselves indispensable. Similar characteristics can 
be ascribed to brokers, who are intermediaries in a chain of patron-client 
relationships. The broker is thus a patron to his clients lower down in the 
hierarchy and a client of those higher up in the chain (e.g. Burgwal 1993; 
De Wit 1989:25). These dynamics of different types of networks raises the 
question: who organizes financial self-help organizations and how are the 
organizers and participants related to one another? 
Tn rhP hn'lnr;.,1 C'Plr_hpln rt.rl'T.,T"'\; ..... .,~;r'\..,r rn.-. .. ouo....i : .... T .... ,..l: ............ ..1 c ......... L 
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works in his mother's shop. Together with some of the customers he 
organized a financial self-help organization, where Rs 2000
6 was collected 
per month and given to each member in turn. Late_r, in 1994, Ros~ had als_? 
become the president of the neighborhood commmee and orgamzed a chit 
fund with twelve men and four women. Most of them were Muslims, except 
for three Hindu members. Rosal was responsible for collecting the 
contributions and in return Rosal received a commission. More important 
than gender and religion for membership in this self-help organization was 
that Rosal knew them, either as customers of his shop or as neighbors. 
Similar membership criteria are applied in a financial self-help 
organization among neighbors in Sangli._ T~is self-help . organization ":'as 
initiated by social workers who were active m that particular commumty 
and who felt that they could provide the participants with a bigger share in 
the profits compared with other financial self-help organizations in the same 
area, where participants pay regular contributions to a common loan 
disbursement fund. 
In contrast to the variety of people being organized in financial self-help 
organizations surveyed in India, most self-help organizations surveyed in 
Cape Town are organized mainly among immediate neighbors. People who 
live more than a few streets away are rarely admitted to them. The bulk of 
the participants are women with children. Men do take part in financial self-
help organizations, but they are generally in a minority. 
Most important of all is physical proximity: members are selected from 
within the neighborhood only. One exception is, for example, the burial 
society; a financial self-help organization that insures its members against 
funeral costs. Burial societies can become quite large - up to a few hundred 
members - and these members do not necessarily live close to one another. 
The reason for this is that it is quite easy to exclude someone who fails to 
make contributions. If a member does not pay, the burial society will simply 
provide no money for a funeral. Some men and women ~so_ establish a 
financial self-help organization among colleagues, but this 1s not very 
common. One reason is that job insecurity is high and that a colleague 
might easily be fired, or quit, an1 lit_erally be lost t~ sight: . 
The financial self-help orgamzattons surveyed m India and South Afnca 
are embedded in a fairly dense network of social relations. Notwithstanding 
the many differences in South Africa and India, face-to-face contact is 
pivotal. The only exceptions are large organizations, such as some Indian 
Savings Associations (SAVAs) and some burial societies in South Africa, 
where fairly low amounts of money are involved. Here, the people save 
regularly in a common fund for a pred_etermined purpos:. . . 
A close examination of the financial self-help orgamzattons surveyed m 
contemporary India and South Africa, demonstrably shows that not all 
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rela~ions are ho~izontal, and that some financial self-help organizations have 
honzontal. relan~ns only to a certain degree. Let us first look at the 
accumulattng savmgs and credit associations (ASCRAs). The members of 
these self-help organizations pool money in a common fund and are able to 
take ou~ loans (~ouman 1994). If the Indian ASCRAs surveyed are to work, 
the vertical relations between_ the organizers and the other participants have 
to be central to the prevention of default and be able to exert sufficient 
cont_rol. The centrality of a few leaders in the organization also make it 
possible for many members to join: after all, not all the members have to be 
trusted by all fellow members as long as the leadership does its job properly. 
Cogently, leaders often make use of linking a couple of participants in such 
a way that one is also responsible for the repayment of the loan of the other. 
~n the South ~:ican ASCRAs studied, relationships are much more 
h_onzontal. All participants know each other quite well and most live within 
view of one another. The participants within this dense network of 
neighborhood relations _have to trust each ~ther and in one instance clearly 
threatened _a?'d put soc~al pressure on a ne1ghbor to get back their money 
through se1zmg possess10n of household items. Although the relations are 
hori_zontal in_ Cap~ T _?Wn, in contrast to the preponderant tendency for 
vertical ones tn India, m both the Indian and South African case studies the 
confiscation of household items is a final resort by which the members 
retrieve their money in case of default. 
Let us now look at the SA V As where members pool money and 
eventually divide it among each other (see Smets 1996). For example, 
members of a SA VA among the Mandula in India created a fund for a 
colle~tive good: the. co~struction of a temple. The participants paid 
relan:ely. smal! contnbuttons. Once the temple was built, the size of the 
conmbunons mcreased and the SAVA was transformed into an ASCRA. 
Central to this self-help organization were the community leaders who 
act~ally use1 the ~A_VA for the collection of fines, which emphasis the 
vertical rela~1on_s w~thm the organization. Control and power were therefore 
part of the msmuttons that dealt with deviant behavior and were borrowed 
fr~m th~ rule of traditional norms and values among the Mandula. Unlike 
this Indian_ example, Balue did not come across people in Cape Town who 
have orgamzed a SAVA for a collective good. Membership of a SA VA is here 
much mo~e exclusive because the members save for personal goals. In the 
South_ ~ncan SAVA and ASCRA, only a few people are responsible for 
orgamzmg the fund at the bank. As mentioned, relations are more often 
horizontal than th:y w_ere in lndi~, although the web of relations is not very 
dense. The combmanon of honzomal relations with a dispersed social 
network has made these organizations vulnerable to fraud or at least 
allegations of fraud. The few people who had to be con;rolled could 
there-fore- not he- m:in:i~Prl rnmnlPtPlv 
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Trust 
The success of financial self-help organizations depends largely on trust. As 
Putnam (1993:171) argues: '[t]rust lubricates cooperation. The greater the 
level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation' 
(see also Luhmann 1979:64). The interest in trust is not a new 
phenomenon, but regained attention in the 1990s (e.g. Fukuyama 1 ?95; 
Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Smets et al. 1999). Trust can be gamed 
through face-to-face contact, long-term _acquaintan~es~ip ~d mutually 
reliable credentials. But it can also be considered as reliability m an abstract 
system such as an institution, where faceless commitments are made 
(Giddens 1995:34, 80-3). For the latter type of trust, Luhmann (1988) 
suggests using the word confidence instead of trust. 
The success of a financial self-help organization depends largely on trust 
in the people who participate in them and is based on social relations, much 
less on trust in institutions. Trust is often not a priori present in India and 
South Africa. Nevertheless, many people do organize financial self-help 
organizations and in most instances financial self-help o~gar:iizations 
function very well. Participants in financial self-help organizations are 
mostly aware that they are taking risks, as they do not know the exact 
financial situation of other participants or their willingness to pay. 
Pertin~ntly, the poor often do not know if they themselves will always be 
able to contribute properly. The insecure circumstances in which they have 
to live, because of unemployment, irregular work in the informal sector, or 
dependence on others for financial support make it difficult for them to 
predict their own financial situati_on in the near fu~ur~. T~ trust anot~er 
person as participant in a financial self-help organization is problemat~c, 
because of the difficulty in obtaining insight into people's financial 
circumstances. This permits no more than an estimation of their 
trustworthiness. But, how is this trustworthiness established? 
Trust has to be understood by analyzing the social relations of people co-
operating with one another, (see als? Bahre and Smets _1999). _Trust is 
intimately related to peoples behavior and face-to-face mteractton. Co-
operation on the basis of blind trust is very rare. This does not me~ that 
institutional trust, or confidence, is completely absent. For example, m the 
1970s when a large ASCRA in Sangli collapsed because of default, financial 
self-help organizations had to cede some of their popularity became less 
popular in that neighborhood, because people no longer trusted each other. 
Only years later, when these feelings had abated, did people again start to 
organize ASCRAs. 
Although trust cannot be achieved completely, people do h~ve ~eans to 
lessen the risks that they take. Such measures concern the relationships they 
1 • 1 1 J ·- ---=---•--L .... ~"' hu:1,.t;_,,. ,...,f rPM11t"'lt";nn Ar:. R':lilPv 
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bankrupted; about gossip and insult and 'one-upmanship; in short, about 
the rules of how to play' the social game and how to win it.' 
If trust is earned, apart from income, it is based on financial behavior 
restricted or no use of alcohol, the reputation of a person's household, ancl 
behavior in obs_erving religious rules. In other words, people have to earn 
trust on the basis of proved behavior, but in certain situations, such as inter-
caste relationships, ascribed trust and distrust determine the trustworthiness 
of persons (see Knorringa 1999). 
A person does not always find it easy to judge the trustworthiness of 
o~her people. A shopkeeper, for example, has a closely-knit network of 
clients of whom he knows a bit more about their family situation. He can 
also keep an eye on clients who have not paid their debts in time. Such a 
person could be tr~s~ed as an organizer of a financial self-help organization, 
even when the participants do not know each other sufficiently well to judge 
each other's trustworthiness. 
In South Africa, for example, mothers are regarded as being more 
respectable and trustworthy because they have the responsibility for their 
children. Some w?men even pretend to have a child for this very reason. 
Because many children do not grow up with their parents but live with 
relatives in the ~aster~ Cape, it is quite feasible to be a mother even though 
there are no children m the household. Many women also complain about 
men who are not regarded as respectable because they are said to drink too 
much alcohol and are content to laze at home unemployed. In India, 
experiences were similar. Rosal, for example, explained that 'ladies are very 
prompt in making payments. The ladies think that they should not be 
blamed for delay in payments. It are the gents who postpone it.' 
. Reputa_tion only matters in a fairly dense social network and if people 
mterac~ with one another frequently. Under such circumstances, a person's 
reputat10n matters because people who a re said to misbehave or who were 
known to be dishonest are avoided. But ascribed reputation can also work 
against trust. It is difficult to refuse a person who enjoys a high status in the 
community membership of a large financial self-help organization, even 
though that person is known to be a troublemaker. In other words, people 
who are not really trusted can sometimes still join the financial self-help 
organ!zat!on. One problem is_ that it is sometimes hard to keep the 
organization unknown to outsiders. Some people may find out about it 
throug~ gossip and force their way into the financial self-help organization. 
In. I?dia, moreover, people who behave strictly according to moral and 
religious codes - and therefore ought to us have a good reputation - are also 
treated with some suspicion when it money matters come into play. If a 
person behaved so appropriately towards the outside world, surely he must 
have something to hide, reasoned some participants. Also in South Africa, 
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jealousy and it is usually people whom a person knows very intimately who 
might become jealous and cause harm (Bahre 2000; 2002). 
Generally, people are often reluctant to trust one another. The low-
income participants in financial self-help organizations almost invariably live 
in economically and politically insecure environments. People tend to 
distrust rather than trust one another. Only after a relationship has been 
established, can distrust begin to be dissolved although it never disappears 
completely. In both research areas, the judiciary system and policing do not 
provide a source of trust as they often malfunction or perhaps because 
financial self-help organizations are not recognized by law. The neighbor-
hoods are often violent and especially in the South African townships 
studied by Bahre (2001) mafia-type organizations have tried to gain control 
of all economic activities. Now, the increasing spread of AIDS in India and 
South Africa is damaging the trust in one another, because the chance that 
people will drop out because of ill health or death is great (see for Southern 
Africa: Athmer 2001). 
Control 
Reputation not only allows people to trust one another, also functions as a 
form of social control. Control mechanisms can play an important role in 
enforcing behavior. Control can, like trust, be distinguished into 
institutional and social control. Institutional control or control of an 
organization, place, or system refers to the set-up and enforcement of 
regulations provided by those institutions to influence people's behavior and 
actions. Social control refers to 'social processes by which the behaviour of 
individuals or groups are regulated. Since all societies have norms and rules 
governing conduct [ ... ) all equally have some mechanisms for ensuring 
conformity to those norms and dealing with deviance.' (Marshall 
1994:485). Social control is often strongly presented among members of 
financial self-help organizations. People do not want to acquire a bad 
reputation and this compels them to comply with the rules and regulations 
of the organization. Because people often know one another in more than 
one context, default in a financial self-hdp organization also has 
consequences for other activities and relationships. 
A financial self-help organization can also be an instrument by which 
community leaders enforce social control. For example, a financial self-help 
organization among the Mandula was used for the collection of fees. 
Whenever someone behaved defiantly within the Mandula community, that 
person had to make a financial contribution to the fund. Moreover, 
whenever someone got married, Rs 1000 had to be contributed. This money 
was used for a festive communal meal at the wedding in order to relieve 
~omP of tht> hn:mri:il h,m1Pn e.nt:iilt>rl hv thf' m:irri:iP-e. Jn nrnctice. however. 
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a communal meal organized with the SA VA money, they needed to serve a 
meal for wedding guests. 
In _South Africa, mu~ual_ exchange systems, which also take place in 
financial self-help organ1zat1ons, can also function as a form of social 
control. For example, commuters charge a pack of Mcintosh sweets if a 
fellow com_muter had missed the train. This helped them to get up early and 
catch the nght train into the city to be at work in time. From what began as 
a 'game' the commuters developed a financial self-help organization (Bahre 
and Smets 1999:57). 
Whenever a member fails to contribute, or is expected to fall short, social 
control functions as a way which ensures that the member still pays. This 
can vary from malicious gossip or spreading rumors, to personal visits to the 
member. Who makes such a visit depends on the kind of relations. If the 
relati~ns ~mo_ng members are vertical, the organizer of the financial self-help 
organ~zat~on 1s expected to. take on the d~ty. If, however, financial self-help 
orgamzanons are more horizontally orgamzed, it is more likely that a group 
of members will pay such a visit. For social control to work properly, it is 
important that members live close to one another, or else have other places 
where they cannot avoid each another. Some rules of the ASCRA also 
function as a form of social control. All members are expected to attend at 
:ill the meetings. Some feel this is inconvenient and prefer to put the money 
man envelope and ask a fellow member to take it along. They have to pay a 
small fine as a penalty for not attending the meeting. More importantly, 
members who are not present at the meeting are then not allowed to borrow 
money from the ASCRA. Only those who turn up can borrow money. 
Cogently, the loan hardly ever exceeds the financial contribution that the 
member has made in the past. Because of the horizontal relations, many 
members feel responsible if a fellow member does not pay in time and are 
therefore willing to put pressure on the member. 
~n India a?d South Africa, financial self-help organizations with 
horizontal relanons appear to be more sensitive to social control than the 
financial self-help organizations that are organized by one or a few leaders. It 
therefore does seem that, as Putnam found in Italy, horizontal relations are 
more likely to be found with social capital than are hierarchical relations. 
Social control is not the last resort that people turn to, as it is not always 
sufficient to prevent default. For example, Smets (1992) came across a 
financial self-help organization where the secretary was accused of fraud. 
The secretary had pocketed money that, according to the books, had been 
disbursed as loans. In another instance, the leader of a SAVA used the 
money for personal gain and was accused of having used it for building a 
house. Because many poor South Africans are almost illiterate, it is quite 
easy for the organizers of an ASCRA or burial society to cheat. The 
C:tlCtJl:1tinnc; ~rp nH"Pn rnmnlPv urhilP inr,=-.,.,=-c-t- ..-.-,~a,r n ..... ..l ....... - ... -. ....... : .... ____ .._ _ 
228 Peer Smets and Erik Bahre 
economic sector, it does not lead to a permanent and complete collapse of 
financial self-help organizations. 
In addition to social control, members apply physical threats and threats 
of confiscation of property. The pressures that are put on members can be 
quite severe and incidentally they have led to suicide, or possibly murder. 
For example, in Sangli the third cycle of an ASCRA was coming to its end, 
but the money had not been recovered in time. Just before the money had 
to be paid back to all members, the person responsible committed suicide. 
Some people told Smets that the account books had been burned in order to 
hide that the total collected fund of Rs 500,000 was gone. For South Africa, 
Lukhele (1990) has described how a man who was robbed of the money of a 
burial society was found dead hanging from a rafter at a railway station three 
days later. 
The visits that people pay to members are mostly far from pleasant and 
are often hostile. Smets (1992), for example, describes how the organizer of 
a financial self-help organization kept on trying to get in touch with a 
member who had failed to contribute. The member, however, was in 
permanent hiding and the organizer could not get hold of him. Shrewdly, 
the organizer found a way to make sure that the member could not avoid 
him. In this neighborhood in Sangli residents had no toilets in their homes 
and had to relieve themselves on a special designated public field. The 
organizer stood guard and finally caught the man. He publicly humiliated 
him and scolded him. In the meantime, the defaulter had felt very 
uncomfortable because he had to relieve himself but could not do so. This 
way it was made sure that he paid the contribution. 
Bahre also found that women were pressurized at meetings and visited in 
their homes. Members of one ASCRA visited a woman who failed to return 
a loan and they took virtually all her humble belongings, such as a black and 
white television, pots and pans, and the curtains. They sold these belongings 
among the members for very cheap prices and used that money to repay the 
loan. Although the woman was very poor, and although the participants felt 
very uncomfortable about what they were doing, they nevertheless resorted 
to confiscation and public humiliation (Bahre 2002). In another instance, 
tensions within a self-help organization led to rumors about witchcraft 
(Bahre 2001). 
Reputation, social capital, and trust were not always sufficient guarantees 
to ensure financial self-help organizations functioned. Although social 
capital was built up to some extent, even among African migrants in Cape 
Town who hardly knew one another, it only solved the problems of 
collective action to some extent. At some stage there was always the, often 
implicit, threat of coercion, confiscation, destruction of one's livelihood, 
and physical violence. This raises serious doubts about whether financial 
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about th~ir _organi23:tion positively by stressing solidarity, trust, and mutual 
support~ It 1s ess~nt1~ to look beyond this image and be sensitive to other 
mechanisms behmd it, such as the threat of violence and the confiscation of 
property. 
Cautions for the microfinance industry 
1>s shown above, social capital as wielded in financial self-help organizations 
IS a pow~rful tool because of the implicit threat of physical violence and the 
con~scauon of ~o~ehold ~te_nsils. These threats seem to work very 
effic1e_ntl~ and hm1~ the mc1~en':e ?f d~fa~lt in financial self-help 
org~mzat1~ns. ~or m1~rofinance mst1tut1ons, it 1s assumed that relying on 
social capital, mcludmg peer pressure, will cover the risks of default 
e~pecially when c~nventional collateral is lacking. Here, just as in othe; 
~nds of economic development, social capital is seen as a powerful 
instrument . 
. A well-kn_ow~ c_ase ?f the use of social capital in group-based 
m1crofinance 1~s~1tut1ons 1s the Grameen Bank, which gives small loans to 
more than 2 million poor borrowers. Although the repayment rate is as high 
as 97 percent (see e.g. Woolcock 1998:182-7), Jain (1996) revealed that 
group guarantee is actually not practiced and is not the reason for the bank's 
success. According to Rahman (2001:2): 
many of the borrowers of the project become victims of institutional 
use of social ideology; they encounter intense pressure from joint-
liability model of the Bank for timely repayment; they maintained their 
regular repayment schedules, but do so through a process of loan 
recycling (i.e., pay off previous loans with new ones) thus, build 
considerable debt liabilities for the household, and face with 
unintended consequences of the erosion of social safety-net and group 
solidarity, as well as encounter aggression and violence. 
Any effective use of social capital by microfinance institutions appears to be 
restricted. In such institutions physical violence cannot be tolerated because 
of the legal status of these institutions. When fieldworkers of microfinance 
institu_tions us~ violence or confiscate goods in the case of a default, they are 
operating outside the legal system. We cannot imagine a system of law that 
allow:s people to be their own judge and jury in the case of default. 
Adm~tte1ly, at present the legal system in many developing countries is not 
fun~t1omng prop~rly, ?ut once it has been improved, these self-help 
punishment practices Will he Ollt Ot thf" nllP,t"inn rl;,,n,-~ ~f m:~~~~-----
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The microfinance business is being encouraged to reach 100 million of 
the world's poorest households, especially the women of these households, 
with credit for self-employment and other financial and business servic~s by 
the year 2005 (Micro Credit Summit 1997). This targ_et e_nco_urages micro-
finance institutions to serve the poor, although these msntunons are often 
unaware of the fact that their intervention can destroy or harm the 
operation of 'informal' financial self-help organizations and the function in 
which they serve their beneficiaries. In other words, '[t]he new policies erode 
the traditional forms of safety net.' (Rahman 2001:7). The situation is even 
worse when the intervening agency makes use of a top-down approach, 
without seriously consulting the beneficiaries (for urban Indonesia see Lant, 
in this volume). 
For example, employees working for the Indian Grameen Bank replica 
SHARE said that they never bothered to look at existing financial self-help 
organizations in a specific village where they wanted to set up savings and 
credit groups. Indeed, they were not aware of the fact that people already 
had self-financing arrangements or that their intervention could destroy or 
harm existing savings and credit associations. They even condemned the 
traditional systems as backward and claimed their scheme would be ?etter. 
Also in Gambia (Africa), intervention did not seem to be beneficial to all. 
The poor in particular benefited less from the scheme: 
[T]he traditional kafos [self-help organisations] had an explicit village 
welfare objective, the NGOs and the VISACAs [village banks, 
established by an NGO] are trying to develop local institutions with 
more of a business approach to savings and credit. Villagers with more 
assets may find they are better served by NGOs and VISACAs than 
they were by traditional kafos. But the marginal population may be 
rationed out of these NGO activities. (Nagarajan et al. 1994:219) 
Smets' research in India has also shown that the involvement of the 
development sector can do more harm than good to social capital: . 
In one of the slum areas in Hyderabad a woman entered the neighbor-
hood and told the dwellers there to leave their chit fund (ROSCA) and join 
a savings and credit scheme introduced by the chu_r~h. T~e dwellers gave up 
participation in their chit fund and started to participate m the new scheme 
after being motivated by the organizer to do so. However, when she stopped 
organizing the scheme, everything collapsed. Moreover, the trust between 
the dwellers was harmed and they did not trust each other any more. As a 
consequence they did not dare to start their own chit fund. . 
Balue found that in Cape Town NGO schemes for housing found 
themselves in competition with existing financial self-help organizations, 
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When existing social capital is destroyed and replaced by new capital, 
introduced by an intervening agency, trust relations among the community 
members can be impaired. It will take a long time before new initiatives will 
flourish. Wilson (1997:756) shows that social capital is obtained and rebuilt 
step by step by individuals in concert action with others. One of the 
consequences of the promotion of top-down initiated self-help is that social 
capital is taken for granted as the key to the building of microfinance 
institutions. This is all the more alarming when the 'new' self-help scheme 
harms established means of social capital, self-financing arrangements at a 
community level are seriously harmed. 
Social capital should not be glorified as the solution in microfinance. 
The financial self-help organizations have shown the importance of social 
capital combined with severe threats and actions against members. Some 
doubts could be raised whether the microfinance institutions should and can 
reproduce such mechanisms, as illustrated below. 
In Mozambique, a microfinance project had promoted solidarity groups 
of three to five people. Within each group, all members were held 
responsible for the repayment of credit obtained for income-earning 
activities. Moreover, each member had to indicate certain productive or 
household assets as security, which could be confiscated in the case of a 
default. Both security measures are formalized in a contract between the 
peer group and the lender. Should a default occur, the project was not 
permitted by law to confiscate these goods but could make use of the peer 
factor. However, the group members refrained from doing so and asked the 
project management to step in. A new solution was found by employing the 
police as debt collectors, against a fixed percentage of the installments 
collected. After a local human rights commission protested against these 
illegal practices, it was immediately stopped. In this project, the peer factor 
did not work because the group members considered the project to be rich; 
they did not want to confiscate goods from their peers, who defaulted. In 
addition, the legal system was very weak, which minimized the possibilities 
open to the microfinance project to take legal steps (personal commu-
nication from Gabrielle Athmer). 
At a meeting in South Africa the functioning of a microfinance 
programme came up for discussion. One of the organizers proudly said that 
the microfinance scheme had worked out very well and that the members 
were very 'committed'. She gave the example of a woman who had used the 
loan to start raising chickens. She was so 'committed', the organizer 
explained: the member had not eaten all day and went to bed hungry in 
order to repay her loan installment to the microfinance institution. The fact 
that she did not even eat in order to repay was regarded as a sign of the 
success of the microfinance institution. The fact that it is unhealthy to stop 
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such instances the microfinance institution receives more attention than the 
people who participate in it. As Rahman (2001:7) eloquently put it: 
The current practice of microfinance reveals that the term 
'microfinance' refers only to a vehicle without saying that (sic) is in it 
or where they are going. Sadly, there is a growing fascination among us 
with the mechanics of microfinance, with the vehicle. There is less and 
less concern about the passengers and their destination. Unless, we turn 
our attention back to the passengers and the destination of that vehicle, 
we will lose our way. 
These experiences are only some examples of the havoc ~hat m~crofinance 
institutions can cause when they attempt to rely on social capital. When 
they embark on such an undertaking, microfinance institutio~s are. in 
danger of creating more financi3! prob_leI?s for th~ ~oor, mcreasmg 
inequalities and violence, damagmg ex1stu~g . o~ga_mzanons_ that_ have 
important social security functions, as well as d1mm1shmg trust m society. If 
intervening agencies aim_ to establ_ish 1:1icrofin_ance schemes, t~ey shoul_d fir~t 
consider whether any mtervent1on 1s required at all. If mtervent1on 1s 
required, they have to look beyond simplistic models of s?ciety ~nd_ cult1;1re 
and instead consider what the consequences are when social capital 1s relied 
upon. 
Conclusion 
In order to cope with risks of default amo_ng the poorer sectio_ns. of society, 
social capital (network, trust and control) 1s a powerful dynamic mstrume?t 
in financial self-help organizations. Social capital works well when one of its 
main weapons is losing face, but also it can also involve threats of violence 
and other drastic sanctions such as the confiscation of goods. In the 
microfinance industry, social capital is considered a useful instrument in the 
absence of conventional collateral. However, the effectiveness of the use of 
social capital is dependent on the possibility of the imposition of severe 
sanctions and violent behavior. In microfinance institutions, the threat of 
violence and confiscation of goods is limited because of their legal backing. 
In other words, the process of institutionalization creates an inherent 
friction with social capital. An increased process of institutionalization goes 
hand in hand with a process of decreasing effectiveness of the use of social 
capital. This can be attributed to the incommensurability ot powerful 
threats and actions with the institutional framework of mterofinance 
organizations. We hope that this hypothetical st~tement _wi!l en_courage 
rPCP'lrrhPrc nnli,-,, m,:il,-Pr<: ,:inrl f,,.frJ,.,nrl,-pr,;: tn nhr~in mnrP 1n~1~ht into thf' 
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Secrets of Institutional Transformation: The Low Politics of 
Financial Self-help Organizations in Post-Colonial Africa1 
Otto Hospes and Mark Prose 
Introduction 
One of the most difficult tasks of those studying member-based financial 
self-help organizations in developing countries is to describe, analyze and 
compare their institutional complexity - taking a perspective of change and 
assuming that the development of such organizations is an expression of and 
contribution to many other processes (Bouman 1994). The first problem to 
be tackled is their diversity in terms of 'being', of functions, embeddedness, 
scale and meanings. The organization is possibly part (of the activities) of a 
labor group, care arrangement, religious society, migrant population, 
government programme or foreign development project (Hospes 1996:145-
70; Kappers 1986; Mrak 1989). Rahmato's case on rural institutions in 
post-revolution Ethiopia is exemplary: 
The institution that is of interest to us is the edir which is universal 
here and to which virtually every household belongs. On the surface 
the edir is a burial society, the kind commonly found elsewhere in rural 
Ethiopia or Africa. However, a closer look reveals that the organization 
is a multi-purpose body, with wider and more socially-oriented 
responsibilities. [ ... ] In many communities the larger edir, which may 
have a membership of 300 or more households, is often sub-divided 
into smaller edir, sometimes called amba, consisting of 50 or more 
households. The following are the most important cooperative and 
support activities carried out through the amba. First is the mutual 
exchange of labour to help families [ ... ] Connected with this is the 
practice of supporting families unable to farm their land due to old age, 
widowhood or serious physical disabilities. [ ... ] Secondly, amba 
provides credit services to its members: needy peasants have access to 
' This article draws heavily on conceptual and fieldwork undertaken as part of the 
comparative WUR-FAO research (1998-2001) called 'The Forgotten Dimension of 
Rural Development: Savings of the Rural Poor - A Cross-Cultural Review of PPP and 
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